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OPINION 
________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 In this case, we are asked to determine whether 
appellant, Francis Rawls, should be released from confinement 
for civil contempt.  On September 30, 2015, Rawls was 
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incarcerated for civil contempt after he failed to comply with a 
court order that he produce several of his seized devices in a 
fully unencrypted state.  Since that day, more than four years 
ago, Rawls has been held in federal custody.  Rawls seeks 
release arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1826 limits his maximum 
permissible confinement for civil contempt to 18 months. 
   
 Because we conclude § 1826 applies to Rawls, we will 
reverse the order of the District Court and order Rawls’ release. 
 
I 
 
 The circumstances surrounding Rawls’ present 
confinement for civil contempt began with an investigation 
into Rawls’ access to child pornography.  As a part of that 
investigation, the Delaware County Criminal Investigations 
Unit executed a search warrant at Rawls’ residence, yielding 
an Apple iPhone 5S, an Apple iPhone 6 Plus, and an Apple 
Mac Pro Computer (the “Mac Pro”) with two attached Western 
Digital External Hard Drives, all of which were protected with 
encryption software.1 
 
 Agents from the Department of Homeland Security then 
obtained a federal search warrant to examine the seized 
devices.  Rawls voluntarily provided the password for the 
Apple iPhone 5S but did not provide the passwords to decrypt 
the Mac Pro or the external hard drives.  Ultimately, forensic 
                                              
1 Encryption technology transforms plain, understandable 
information into unreadable letters, numbers, or symbols using 
a fixed formula or process.  Only those who possess a 
corresponding “key” can return the information into its original 
form, i.e. decrypt that information.   
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analysts discovered the password to decrypt the Mac Pro but 
could not determine the passwords to decrypt the external hard 
drives.  Forensic examination of the Mac Pro revealed (1) an 
image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, 
(2) logs showing that the Mac Pro had been used to visit 
websites with titles common in child exploitation, and (3) that 
Rawls had downloaded thousands of files known to be child 
pornography.  Those files, however, were not on the Mac Pro, 
but instead were stored on the encrypted external hard drives.  
In the course of their investigation, officers interviewed Rawls’ 
sister who stated that Rawls had shown her hundreds of images 
of child pornography on the encrypted external hard drives, 
which included videos of children who were nude and engaged 
in sex acts with other children.  But, without a password to 
decrypt the hard drives, agents could not access the files 
themselves. 
 
 In August 2015, a Magistrate Judge ordered Rawls to 
produce all encrypted devices, including his two attached 
external hard drives, in a fully unencrypted state, pursuant to 
the All Writs Act (the “Decryption Order”).  Rawls did not 
appeal the Decryption Order.  Instead, he filed a motion to 
quash the Government’s application to compel decryption, 
arguing that his act of decrypting the devices would violate his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
 Eventually, Rawls’ motion to quash was denied and 
Rawls was directed to fully comply with the Decryption Order.  
The Magistrate Judge acknowledged Rawls’ Fifth Amendment 
objection, but held that, because the Government possessed his 
devices and knew that their contents included child 
pornography, the act of decrypting the devices would not be 
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testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
 
 Approximately one week after the denial of Rawls’ 
motion to quash, Rawls and his counsel appeared at the 
Delaware County Police Department for the forensic 
examination of his devices.  Rawls produced the Apple iPhone 
6 Plus in a fully unencrypted state by entering three separate 
passwords on the device.  The phone contained adult 
pornography, a video of Rawls’ four-year-old niece in which 
she was wearing only her underwear, and approximately 
twenty photographs which focused on the genitals of Rawls’ 
six-year-old niece.  Rawls, however, stated that he could not 
remember the passwords necessary to decrypt the hard drives 
and entered several incorrect passwords during the forensic 
examination.  
 
 Following the forensic examination, the Government 
moved to show cause why Rawls should not be held in 
contempt for his failure to comply with the Decryption Order.  
Two hearings were held on the issue in which, “Rawls offered 
no on-the-record explanation for his present failure to 
comply.”2  Based on the evidence presented, the District Court 
found that Rawls remembered the passwords needed to decrypt 
the hard drives but chose not to reveal them because of the 
devices’ contents.  Thus, the District Court granted the 
Government’s motion to hold Rawls in civil contempt, stating 
“Rawls will be incarcerated indefinitely until he agrees to 
comply with and actually does comply with the [Decryption 
Order].”3  We affirmed the District Court’s contempt order 
                                              
2 App. 26. 
3 App. 27. 
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holding, inter alia, that the Magistrate Judge did not err by 
finding that the Decryption Order did not implicate the Fifth 
Amendment privileged against self-incrimination.4   
 
 Rawls then filed a motion for a stay of the contempt 
order and for release, which is presently at issue.  In that 
motion, Rawls argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) limits the 
maximum period of confinement for civil contempt to 18 
months.  The District Court denied his motion.  We now 
consider Rawls’ appeal of that denial. 
 
II5 
 
We have previously recognized that Congress, through 
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), placed a limit on the inherent authority of 
                                              
4 United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 241–
42 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018).   
5 The Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction to issue the search 
warrant and Decryption Order pursuant to Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the All Writs Act.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”).  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The case 
turns on matters of statutory construction.  We exercise plenary 
review of a District Court’s interpretation of statutes.  Gibbs v. 
Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 (3d Cir. 1998).    
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courts to hold individuals in civil contempt for their failure to 
comply with court orders.6  In full, §1826(a) states:  
 
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
States refuses without just cause shown to 
comply with an order of the court to testify or 
provide other information, including any book, 
paper, document, record, recording or other 
material, the court, upon such refusal, or when 
such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may 
summarily order his confinement at a suitable 
place until such time as the witness is willing to 
give such testimony or provide such information. 
No period of such confinement shall exceed the 
life of— 
 
(1) the court proceeding, or 
(2) the term of the grand jury, including 
extensions, 
 
before which such refusal to comply with the 
court order occurred, but in no event shall such 
confinement exceed eighteen months.7 
 
Critically, in the final sentence of §1826(a), the statute places 
an 18-month cap on the period of time a court can keep a 
witness confined for his or her refusal to “comply with an order 
of the court to testify or provide other information.”8  
                                              
6 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 426-27 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
7 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (emphasis added). 
8 Id. 
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The question in this case is simply whether § 1826(a)’s 
18-month limitation applies to Rawls.  The Government argues 
that Rawls was not a “witness” participating in any 
“proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of 
the United States” within the meaning of § 1826(a).  We 
disagree.  Accordingly, we reverse the order of the District 
Court and order Rawls’ release.   
 
Section 1826(a)’s 18-month limitation applies to 
Rawls’ present confinement because (A) Rawls is a witness for 
the purposes of § 1826(a), (B) the proceedings to enforce the 
search warrant fall within the statute’s broad description of  any 
“proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of 
the United States,” (C) the Decryption Order is “an order of the 
court to testify or provide other information, including any 
book, paper, document, record, recording or other material,” 
and (D) we read § 1826(a) to apply to the detention of any 
material witness, even if that person is also a suspect in 
connection with other offenses.   
 
A 
 
 First, Rawls is a witness within the meaning of 
§ 1826(a) both because he is being asked to provide testimonial 
information and because the statute reaches even non-
testimonial acts of production.   
 
 A witness is, at the very least, “[s]omeone who gives 
testimony.”  Witness, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), 
and the Supreme Court has recognized that compliance with 
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requests for evidence can constitute testimony.9  Notably, the 
testimonial value of production is not necessarily tied to the 
content of the evidence itself.  “[B]y producing documents, one 
acknowledges that the documents exist, admits that the 
documents are in one’s custody, and concedes that the 
documents are those that the subpoena requests.”10  As is 
pertinent to this case, in producing the passwords needed to 
decrypt the external hard drives, Rawls would be 
acknowledging that the hard drives were in his control and that 
he was capable of accessing them—an act with testimonial 
value.11   
 
 Moreover, as several of our sister circuits have held, a 
person may be a “witness” under § 1826(a) even when the 
                                              
9 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208–10 (1988). 
10 United States v. Chabot, 793 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 559 (2015). 
11 In concluding that decryption is “testimonial,” we do not 
question our prior holding that Rawls could not claim the Fifth 
Amendment privilege in response to the decryption orders.  
Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d at 248.  That holding 
turned not on whether decryption would be testimonial—it 
would, see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000) 
(“[T]he act of producing documents in response to a subpoena 
may have a compelled testimonial aspect.”)—but on whether 
it would add “to the information already obtained by the 
Government.”  Because, in Rawls’ case, it would not have 
provided any such additional information, the exception to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege recognized in Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), for testimonial acts of production 
where the Government already knows of both the documents’ 
“existence and possession or control,” id. at 412, applied.   
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evidence he refuses to produce is not considered “testimonial” 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.  See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 541 F.2d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying 
§ 1826(a)’s limitation on confinement to a witness who refused 
to provide handwriting exemplars); United States v. Mitchell, 
556 F.2d 371, 384 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying § 1826(a)’s 
limitation on confinement to criminal defendants who refused 
to provide voice exemplars); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
873 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying § 1826(a) to a 
refusal to provide bank records); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 
702 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying § 1826(a) to a refusal to stand in 
a line up).  
 
 We have signaled our agreement by affirming the 
confinement of a grand jury witness under § 1826(a) for 
refusing to provide handwriting exemplars.12  Although we 
concluded, based on Supreme Court precedent,13  that the 
provision of exemplars was not “testimonial” for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment, we did not question the District Court’s 
authority to confine the contemnor pursuant to § 1826(a) and 
repeatedly deemed him a “witness.”14  So too here, then, 
Rawls’ decryption of his devices—even assuming it were not 
testimonial—would make him a “witness” within the ambit of 
§ 1826(a).  See Mitchell, 556 F.2d at 384 (explaining that “the 
failure of the defendants to obey the court order to give voice 
exemplars” fell within § 1826’s ambit “even though the non-
                                              
12 In re Special Fed. Grand Jury, 809 F.2d 1023, 1025 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
13 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967). 
14 See e.g., In re Special Fed. Grand Jury, 809 F.2d at 1024–
25, 1027. 
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testimonial nature of the evidence makes Fifth Amendment 
protections inapplicable”). 
 
In arguing that Rawls was not a witness within the 
meaning of § 1826(a), the Government relies heavily on the 
reasoning of United States v. Harris.15  This reliance is 
misplaced.  In Harris, the Court found that the contemnor, 
Harris, was not a “recalcitrant witness.”16  Although the Court 
did not elaborate as to why Harris was not a witness, the facts 
of the case made the conclusion clear.  In that case, Harris was 
not held for a failure to provide information of any sort.  
Instead, he was held in civil contempt for his refusal to stop 
“affirmatively . . . sending out” “bogus liens and judgments” 
against the judges and prosecutors involved in the underlying 
case.17  As a result, the Harris Court did not substantively 
engage with the question of how a witness is defined under 
§ 1826(a).   
 
There is a significant difference between a contempt 
confinement for failure to provide information and 
confinement for failure to stop actively harassing court 
personnel.  Unlike the contemnor in Harris, Rawls is being 
asked to provide information in a proceeding and is therefore a 
witness under § 1826(a). 
    
B 
 
 Next, the proceedings to enforce the search warrant 
qualify as “court proceeding[s]” within the meaning of 
                                              
15 582 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2009). 
16 Id. at 517.  
17 Id. at 513–14. 
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§ 1826(a).  A proceeding may be defined more narrowly as the 
“regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts 
and events between the time of commencement and the entry 
of judgment” or more broadly as the “business conducted by a 
court or other official body.”18  As Rawls argues, proceedings 
to obtain and enforce a search warrant are marked by the 
procedural formalities that define other court proceedings: a 
basis for jurisdiction, limitations on venue, a standard of proof, 
and a “neutral and detached magistrate.”19  Nothing in the text 
of § 1826(a) lends support to the argument that a “court 
proceeding” is limited to trials.  
 
 Further, at least two circuit courts have held that 
§ 1826(a) is applicable to proceedings outside of grand jury 
proceedings or a criminal trial.   First, in In re Martin-Trigona, 
the Second Circuit applied § 1826(a) to a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 20  In that opinion, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the statute’s use of “any” where it states “[w]henever a 
witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court . . . 
,” indicates that Congress intended § 1826(a) to apply to 
bankruptcy proceedings.21  Second, in In re Application of 
President’s Comm’n on Organized Crime, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that § 1826(a) was applicable to a contemnor’s 
refusal to testify before the President’s Commission on 
Organized Crime (the “Commission”).22  The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that because the Commission “was obliged to secure 
                                              
18 Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
19 Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
20 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984). 
21 Id. 
22 763 F.2d 1191, 1201 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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[the witness’s] testimony by writ of habeas corpus, and by 
enforcement of an immunity order, and because [the witness] 
took legal action to protect himself from the Commission’s 
subpoena, the proceedings before the Commission became 
‘ancillary’ to proceedings before a court.”23  Further, the 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “the documented intent of 
Congress” was for § 1826 to apply to “a range of court-related 
proceedings, including depositions.”24   
 
 Here, the proceeding to obtain and enforce the search 
warrant required an order to be issued by the District Court and 
became adversarial when Rawls sought to quash the 
Decryption Order.  Because courts have interpreted “any 
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury” 
broadly, we conclude that the proceedings to obtain and 
enforce the search warrant in this case fall within the language 
of § 1826(a). 
 
C 
 
 Additionally, the Decryption Order is an order to 
“provide other information” under § 1826(a).  Not only is the 
language used by Congress in this provision broad, but the 
legislative history of § 1826(a) shows that “other information” 
was used “in contradistinction to oral testimony” and “would 
include, for example, electronically stored information or 
computer tapes.”25  The legislative history reveals that, “[i]ts 
                                              
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Palmer v. United States, 530 F.2d 787, 789 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1976) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4008, 4017, 4022). 
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scope is intended to be comprehensive, including all 
information given as testimony, but not orally.”26  The 
production of the hard drives falls within that scope. 
 
D 
 
Finally, we conclude that § 1826(a) applies to a person 
in his or her capacity as a material witness even if that person 
is also a suspect in connection with other offenses.  Although 
Rawls maintains a dual identity—Rawls is a witness for 
purposes of contempt, while a suspect for child pornography 
offenses—we find that § 1826(a) caps Rawls detention for 
committing civil contempt in his capacity as a material witness 
at 18 months.27   
 
If the Government seeks to impose any additional 
deprivation of liberty for Rawls’ status as a suspect in the 
alleged child pornography offenses the Government must 
charge Rawls with those offenses,28 provide Rawls with a trial 
by a jury of his peers, prove those charges beyond a reasonable 
doubt , and sentence Rawls in accordance with due process.  To 
hold that § 1826(a) applies only to witnesses who are not also 
suspected of crimes would do an end run around these 
                                              
26 Id. 
27 At this point Rawls has already been in confinement for more 
than four years without being convicted of, or indicted with, a 
crime.   
28 As detailed supra in Section II, even without decrypting the 
hard drives, the Government has already collected a substantial 
amount of evidence with which it could prosecute Rawls for 
child pornography offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252.   
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fundamental rights and relieve the Government of its burden to 
prove a defendant guilty before imposing punishment.29 
 
III 
 
 For the above reasons, we hold that § 1826 applies to 
Rawls because he is a “witness in [a] proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States” 
presently confined for his refusal to “comply with an order of 
the court to testify or provide other information”: accordingly, 
§ 1826 limits the duration of his confinement to 18 months.30  
We will, therefore, reverse the order of the District Court and 
order Rawls’ release. 
 
                                              
29 In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 425 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“Although the due process test is easily 
formulated, the point at which coercive imprisonment actually 
ceases to be coercive and essentially becomes punitive is not 
readily discernible.”). 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). 
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McKee, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
I join Judge Fuentes’ opinion in its entirety. For reasons he 
explains, I completely agree that a criminal defendant cannot be 
deprived of statutory and constitutional protections afforded those 
accused of crimes merely because s/he also happens to be a material 
witness.  Limitations placed upon the Government’s ability to 
incarcerate a criminal suspect do not disappear into the ethers 
merely because that same person is also subject to confinement as a 
material witness.  
 
However, I write separately because I do not think that the 
Government’s conduct in prosecuting Rawls should escape 
additional comment.  
 
I realize, of course, that I do not know all of the 
circumstances surrounding this case and there may be some hidden 
justification for the Government’s tactics here. However, based on 
the evidence in the record (as briefly summarized by Judge 
Fuentes),1 it appears that the Government is insisting that Rawls’ 
incarceration for contempt be continued even though it already 
possesses sufficient evidence of Rawls’ possession and production 
of child pornography to obtain a conviction under various 
subsections of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252.  In fact, Rawls’ own 
sister’s testimony regarding Rawls’ possession of a video of his two 
nieces, aged four and six, may very well be sufficient to convict him 
of possession and/or production of child pornography involving a 
minor in his custody or control. 
 
Conviction for these offenses could expose him to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment and a 
maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years–assuming this is his 
first such offense.2  If he has prior convictions for child 
pornography, he could be exposed to a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, depending on the number of convictions and the acts 
involved in any prior convictions.3 His exposure is exacerbated by 
the well-known fact that the sentences suggested for such offenses 
under the Sentencing Guidelines are quite severe.  
  
I therefore cannot fathom why the Government is so insistent 
upon further gilding the lily with the evidence that may well be in 
the encrypted files on the disputed hard drives and demanding his 
                                                 
1 See Majority Op. at 3 and 4. 
2 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e).   
3 Id. 
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imprisonment until he “coughs up” that evidence.  There may well 
be some justification for insisting that Rawls be imprisoned on 
contempt charges before his all but certain prosecution for child 
pornography and the very severe sentences he would be exposed to 
if convicted for the latter offenses, but such justification for the 
Government’s conduct here certainly escapes me.  
  
If Rawls is eventually convicted for charges arising from the 
files involved in this case, absent some reasonable argument to the 
contrary, I would hope that the sentencing judge would take his 
rather substantial incarceration for contempt into account when 
deciding upon an appropriate sentence, and I think it worth adding 
this brief concurring opinion to underscore that concern. 
United States of America v. Apple MacPro Computer, et al 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Because I do not agree with the reasoning of the 
majority or of the concurrence, I respectfully dissent.  My 
dissent is based on my belief that 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) should 
be held to cover the situations expressly stated therein:  “any 
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of 
the United States.”  In this case there is no such proceeding – 
at least, not so far.  For that reason, I believe that we should 
not stretch a statute to cover a situation that is not included in 
the language of the statute. 
 
 Because the investigation here is a preliminary one – 
there has not yet been an indictment nor have criminal 
proceedings begun before the District Court or before any 
court, section 1826(a) does not apply and its eighteen-month 
limitation on confinement does not apply.  Moreover, the 
cases cited by the majority do not apply to the present 
situation.1   
 
                                              
1 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (involving a 
proceeding before a grand jury); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 873 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); In re 
Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); United States 
v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1977) (involving indicted 
criminal defendants who refuse to provide voice exemplars)  
2 
 
 To briefly recap the pertinent facts, during an 
investigation into Rawls’ access to child pornography over 
the internet, the Delaware County, Pennsylvania, Criminal 
Investigations Unit executed a valid search warrant at Rawls’ 
residence.  The search yielded, among other things, an Apple 
MacPro computer, an Apple iPhone 6 Plus, and two Western 
Digital external hard drives.  All of the devices were 
protected with encryption software which rendered them 
unreadable without the benefit of corresponding passwords.   
  
Agents from the Department of Homeland Security 
then applied for, and obtained, a federal search warrant to 
examine the seized devices.  During their investigation, 
government analysts discovered the password to decrypt the 
MacPro computer.  Their examination of the computer’s 
contents revealed (1) an image of a pubescent girl in a 
sexually provocative position, (2) logs showing that the 
computer had been used to visit sites with titles common in 
child exploitation, and (3) evidence that the computer had 
been used to download thousands of files known to be child 
pornography.  However, further forensic analysis revealed 
that the child pornography files had been stored not on the 
computer but on the two Western Digital external hard drives.  
As part of the investigation, police officers also interviewed 
Rawls’s sister, who told the officers that Rawls had shown 
her hundreds of images of child pornography on the external 
hard drives, including videos of children engaged in sex acts 
with other children.   
 
The government then applied for a Decryption Order, 
pursuant to the All Writs Act,2 requiring Rawls to produce all 
                                              
2 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
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encrypted devices, including the two Western Digital hard 
drives, in a fully unencrypted state.  After the Magistrate 
Judge issued the Decryption Order, Rawls moved to quash it 
on Fifth Amendment grounds.  The Magistrate Judge denied 
the motion, finding that the Decryption Order did not require 
any testimonial communication of the kind protected by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
 
Rawls and his counsel thereafter appeared at the 
Delaware County Police Department, where Rawls partially 
complied with the Decryption Order by providing the 
password for the iPhone 6 Plus.  The iPhone contained a 
video of Rawls’s four-year-old niece, wearing only 
underwear, and approximately twenty photographs focusing 
on the genitals of Rawls’s six-year-old niece.  However, 
while at the Police Department, Rawls claimed that he could 
not remember the passwords necessary to decrypt the seized 
external hard drives.  He did enter several incorrect 
passwords. 
 
The government moved to show cause why Rawls 
should not be held in contempt for his failure to fully comply 
with the Decryption Order.  The Magistrate Judge held a 
hearing and found that Rawls remembered the passwords 
necessary to decrypt the external hard drives but chose not to 
reveal them.  After a second hearing, the District Court 
granted the government’s motion to hold Rawls in civil 
contempt and ordered his incarceration “until such time that 
he fully complies . . . by permitting access to the two external 
hard drives . . . in a fully unencrypted state.”3  The District 
Court explained that while Rawls’ defense was based on 
                                              
3 App. 21. 
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memory loss, “Rawls did not testify or call any witnesses 
[and] he did not offer any documentary or physical evidence 
into the record . . ..  Crucially, Rawls offered no on-the-record 
explanation for his present failure to comply.”4 
 
In a prior appeal of the contempt order, Rawls argued 
that (1) the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
issue the Decryption Order under the All Writs Act because 
the government should have sought Rawls’s compliance by 
means of grand jury procedure, and (2) the Decryption Order 
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  We affirmed the rulings of the District Court 
and held that (1) the All Writs Act enabled the Magistrate 
Judge to issue an order that sought to effectuate and prevent 
the frustration of the federal search warrant, and (2) the 
Magistrate Judge did not err by finding that the Decryption 
Order did not implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination because the information that would 
be conveyed via Rawls’ compliance—that he knows the 
requisite passwords—was a foregone conclusion.5 
                                              
4 App. 26.  
5 United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 
246, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017); see id. at 247 (Under the 
“foregone conclusion” rule, “the Fifth Amendment does not 
protect an act of production when any potentially testimonial 
component of the act of production—such as the existence, 
custody, and authenticity of evidence—is a ‘foregone 
conclusion’ that ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information.’”  (citing Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976))). 
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Rawls petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, which was denied.6  While the petition was 
pending, Rawls filed a motion for stay of the contempt order 
and for release.  In the motion, he invoked 28 U.S.C. § 
1826(a), contending that it limits the maximum period of his 
confinement for civil contempt to eighteen months. 
 
The District Court convened another hearing, during 
which Rawls refused to state whether he was willing or able 
to comply with the decryption order.  The District Court then 
denied his motion.  Rawls appealed. 
 
 The focus of this appeal is 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), which 
states: 
Whenever a witness in any 
proceeding before or ancillary to 
any court or grand jury of the 
United States refuses without just 
cause shown to comply with an 
order of the court to testify or 
provide other information, 
including any book, paper, 
document, record, recording or 
other material, the court, upon 
such refusal, or when such refusal 
is duly brought to its attention, 
may summarily order his 
confinement at a suitable place 
until such time as the witness is 
                                              
6 See Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018). 
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willing to give such testimony or 
provide such information.  No 
period of such confinement shall 
exceed the life of – 
(1) the court proceeding, or 
(2) the term of the grand jury, 
including extensions, 
before which such refusal to 
comply with the court order 
occurred, but in no event shall 
such confinement exceed eighteen 
months.7 
 The government contends that § 1826 imposes no limit 
on the period for which Rawls may be confined for civil 
contempt because, among other reasons, he is not a “witness 
in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand 
jury of the United States.”  In any event, the government 
contends that we should not lightly assume that Congress 
intended to limit the scope of courts’ inherent power to order 
the confinement of civil contemnors.  Rawls, on the other 
hand, asserts that § 1826’s eighteen-month confinement 
limitation applies to him and therefore that he must be 
released.  He urges us to consider the meaning of the statute 
in light of its legislative history, structure, and purpose.  For 
the reasons discussed below, I disagree with the majority and 
I agree with the government that § 1826 does not apply to 
Rawls because he is not a “witness in any proceeding before 
or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States.”8   
                                              
7 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). 
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Courts derive their contempt powers from the 
Constitution’s vesting “the judicial Power of the United 
States” in the federal courts.9  Indeed, “it is firmly established 
that ‘[t]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all 
courts.”10  While “the exercise of the inherent power of lower 
federal courts can be limited by statute and rule,” courts 
should not “‘lightly assume that Congress has intended to 
depart from established principles’ such as the scope of a 
court’s inherent power.”11  In the absence of a clear indication 
that Congress intended to restrict courts’ inherent power, we 
must “resolve the ambiguities of [a statute] in favor of that 
interpretation which affords a full opportunity for . . . courts 
to [act] in accordance with their traditional practices.”12   
 
Here, there is even greater need for Congress to clearly 
indicate its intent to restrict courts’ inherent power, as 
Congress has explicitly endorsed the courts’ use of coercive 
civil confinement for “[d]isobedience or resistance to its 
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”13  
Moreover, Congress has bolstered courts’ inherent contempt 
powers via the All Writs Act, which enables courts to “issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions.”14 
 
                                              
9 U.S. Const. art. III. 
10 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). 
11 Id. at 47 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305, 313 (1982)). 
12 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944).   
13 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).   
14 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
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 Turning to the specific provisions of § 1826, it is not 
clear that Congress intended the provisions of that statute to 
limit the power of courts to hold individuals such as Rawls, 
the recipient of a valid search warrant, in civil contempt.  In 
fact, the opposite conclusion can be drawn.  The statute refers 
to “a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any 
court or grand jury of the United States.”  Rawls is not a 
“witness,” as his contempt relates only to the Decryption 
Order requiring that he comply with the government’s search 
warrant by producing his devices in a fully unencrypted state. 
 
This case is akin to our precedent in United States v. 
Harris.15  In that case, the district court ordered Harris, during 
pre-trial criminal proceedings, to stop filing bogus liens and 
judgments against judges and prosecutors.  Harris refused to 
comply.16  As a result, the district court held him in contempt 
and ordered him to be incarcerated until he agreed to cease 
making bogus filings.17  Despite failing to comply with the 
court’s order, Harris argued after five years in prison that the 
district court’s contempt order should be vacated because it 
violated due process.18  In making this argument, Harris 
relied on the 18-month limitation in § 1826.19  We disagreed 
with Harris, finding that he “is not, and was not, a recalcitrant 
witness” to whom § 1826 applied.20  The context of that 
holding makes clear that we did not consider Harris a 
“witness” because the conduct that led to his incarceration for 
                                              
15 582 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2009). 
16 Id. at 514. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 516. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 517. 
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contempt was not part of the criminal proceeding for which 
he was charged and sentenced.21 
 
Like Harris, Rawls’s contempt cannot be traced to his 
status as a “witness;” he is merely the recipient of a lawful 
search warrant with which he has failed to comply.  Rawls’s 
interpretation of the term “witness in any proceeding before 
or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States,” 
would render superfluous language appearing later in § 
1826(a)(1) and (2), which limits the period of confinement for 
civil contemnors to the life of “the court proceeding, or . . . 
the term of the grand jury, in including extensions, before 
which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred.”  
When a court proceeding ends, a contemnor can no longer be 
“said to carry . . . ‘the keys of the prison in his own pocket.’”  
In this situation, there is no ongoing trial or grand jury, and 
Rawls’s sole obligation is to produce his hard drives in an 
unencrypted format; Rawls carries the metaphorical key to his 
own release.  
 
Rawls’ attempts to distinguish Harris rely on the fact 
that Rawls has always maintained he cannot remember the 
passwords necessary to decrypt the external hard drives.  The 
Magistrate Judge, however, found that the government has 
adequately proved Rawls’s ability to remember his 
                                              
21 Rawls seeks to distinguish Harris on the ground that the 
contempt in Harris was not predicated upon a failure to 
provide information.  But nowhere in Harris did we suggest 
that § 1826 was inapplicable by virtue of the fact that Harris 
was not required to provide information; instead, we clearly 
stated the basis for our conclusion when we wrote that Harris 
was not a “recalcitrant witness.” 
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passwords.  Rawls chose not to challenge that finding in this 
appeal.  Moreover, if Rawls should contend that he has 
forgotten his passwords, he is free to file a motion with the 
District Court seeking his release on the ground that his 
confinement has ceased to be coercive and has therefore 
become punitive.22     
 
 Rawls raises several other arguments regarding the 
purpose, structure, and legislative history of § 1826, but none 
merit reversal.  I will address each in turn. 
 
Rawls urges us to construe the term “witness” broadly 
in light of the statute’s purpose.  But he cannot point to any 
clear indication in the statute’s “statement of findings and 
purpose” that Congress intended § 1826, or the Omnibus 
Crime Control Act of 1970 (the “Act”)—of which it 
constitutes a small part—to apply to those who fail to comply 
with lawful search warrants.23  Instead, Rawls cites to general 
statements that the Act was intended to remedy defects in 
“the evidence-gathering process.”24  Although Rawls only 
quotes this short phrase, it is actually part of a longer 
congressional finding that “organized crime continues to 
grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of 
the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible 
                                              
22 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 425 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“[A]t some point the confinement ceases to be 
coercive and becomes punitive, thereby raising due process 
concerns” justifying the release of the contemnor in the 
absence of criminal contempt proceedings.) 
23 See generally Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. III, § 301, 84 Stat. 
922, 923 (1970). 
24 84 Stat. at 923.   
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evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or 
remedies to bear . . ..”25  If anything, the statement read as a 
whole suggests that the Act was concerned with ensuring that 
the government has adequate tools for gathering evidence, 
rather than restricting the scope of such tools. 
 
As for the statute’s structure, Rawls notes that the 
phrase “testify or provide other information, including any 
book, paper, document, record, recording or other material” 
in § 1826(a) replicated the exact language used elsewhere in 
the immunity section of the Act.26  But the House Report 
makes clear, in reference to that exact language in the 
immunity section, that although it was meant “to be 
comprehensive,” its scope simply included “all information 
given as testimony, but not orally.”  As I have already pointed 
out, the District Court’s order requiring Rawls to provide his 
hard drives in unencrypted format does not require his 
testimony.27  And the “testify or provide other information” 
language used later in § 1826 does not convert the earlier 
                                              
25 Id. (emphasis added). 
26 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), with 84 Stat. at 927. 
27 Apple MacPro, 851 F.3d at 248. 
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term, “witness,” into something broader than its plain 
meaning.28 
 
Finally, Rawls argues that if § 1826 does not apply to 
him, there is a paradox --  indefinite confinement may 
become permissible so long as no charges are brought.  This 
argument fails to account for the procedural posture of this 
case.  The government has chosen to pursue further 
investigatory steps before deciding whether to bring charges 
against Rawls.  This is not a decision we believe Congress 
intended to discourage via § 1826.29  The government is free 
to seek lawful search warrants and to obtain the fruits of such 
searches before convening a grand jury or pursuing an 
indictment.   
 
III 
                                              
28 Rawls also asks that we interpret § 1826 broadly in light of 
language from the Act’s Senate Report, which states that the 
measure was enacted to define “the power of the courts to 
deal with witnesses who are unlawfully withholding 
information necessary to move forward an investigation.”  
Senate Report at 57 (emphasis added).  However, the Senate’s 
use of the term “witnesses” suggests that, as discussed supra, 
the Senate did not foresee the application of § 1826 to 
recipients of lawful search warrants.   
29 See, e.g., 84 Stat. at 923 (“Statement of Findings and 
Purpose”) (“It is the purpose of this Act to . . . strengthen[] 
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by 
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing 
enhanced sanctions and new remedies . . ..”). 
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 For the above reasons, I would hold that § 1826 does 
not apply to Rawls because he is not a “witness in any 
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of 
the United States.”  I would affirm the contempt order of the 
District Court.   
